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In recent decades, many tminagers and executives have received company stock 
and stock options as a portion of their pay. As the incidence of this phenomenon 
increased, it became evident that insiders needed a way to diversify their holdings. One 
way this could be accommodated is through the issuance of dividends. This paper 
examined how executive stock ownership and managerial power impacted a firm's 
dividend policy. Specifically, it examined the power of an executive as measured by the 
G index. It further took into account the current level of ownership for a particular 
manager, as well as the value of their shares as a percentage of their total compensation, 
and how these measures affected the relationships. We hypothesized that greater 
managerial power and ownership would result in greater dividends issued per share as a 
means to diversify the managers' portfolio of wealth. In order to conduct this analysis, 
data on executive compensation, firm characteristics, and dividend policy was obtained 
from Compustat and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) within Wharton Research 
Data Services (WRDS). Econometric techniques such as regression analysis, panel 
vector auto-regression, and Granger causality tests were employed to test this hypothesis. 
Results looking at both correlation and causality between the power measure, level of 








In the recent past, the way in which executives of companies and firms have 
gotten paid is shifting. In addition to the monetary compensation, many have also begun 
receiving stock of the company they manage as a portion of their pay. This is known as 
stock compensation. 
As the number of shares held by a manger increases, this could result in a manger 
who is not diversified in his perspnal investments. Rather than owning stock in many 
different companies , they might have an investment portfolio that is mostly made up of 
stock from the firm that they manage. 
If this were the case, a manager would not want to sell that stock because if a 
manager is selling stock of the firm they manage it could lead people to believe that 
something is going wrong with that company. Alternatively, if a manager can issue 
dividends, they would have access to cash extracted from their shares of stock without 
actually selling the stock. The extracted cash could then be used to diversify the 
manager's portfolio. 
This is important to understand because if managers are using dividends to 
diversify their portfolio, they may be doing so at the expense of shareholders. Exe.cutives 
should do things that are in the best interest of the people who own stock of the firm they 
manage. Based on this, they should only issue dividends if it is in the best interest of the 
stockholder. If the opposite is true, perhaps there are changes that can be made to restrict 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
,. ':,.• .., 
An important aspect of any investment portfolio involves diversification. 
Diversification may be d_efined as investing in a wide variety of asset classes within a 
portfolio in order to reduce risk and maximize returns. If a portfolio is well diversified, a 
loss on some investments will be offset by the stability or gains of other investments. 
Markowitz (1952) shows that the rational investor will diversify their portfolio in a mean-
variance maximizing manner. 
In recent decades, company stock and stock options have become increasingly large 
portions of managers' and executives' compensation. As of 1995, stock options became 
the largest performance-based incentive compensation received by CEO's, with 2/3 of all 
' 
CEO' s receiving stock options ai;id :the value of such options representing about 1 /3 of total 
I I 
CEO compensation (Y ermack, 1996). Due to the recent growth associated with stock 
( 
compensation, executives should encounter a diversification problem, since a large portion 
of their portfolio is made up of their own firm's stock. Beck and Zorn (1992) confirm this, 
when they state that the costs of insider ownership are borne by insiders, who must allocate 
a large portion of their wealth to the firms, and thus hold undiversified portfolios 
concentrated with their own firm's stock. In this situation, it would be difficult for 
managers to sell stock legally and within the bounds of contracting constraints without 
sending a negative signal to the market. 
While the selling of company stock is one way for managers to diversify their 
holdings, an additional way to do so is through _the issuance of dividends. Research 
indicates that the introduction of executive stock options leads to a reduction in total dollar 
2 
value of dividends issued (Lambert, Lanen & Larcker, 1989). Further research points out 
that managers holding a large number of stock options tend to substitute stock repurchases 
for dividends (Jolls, 1995), resulting in lower total dividend payments. When studying 
corporate payout policy, Fenn and Liang (2001) find that stock options do not encourage 
larger total payouts, but that they change the composition of existing payouts. This 
suggests that stock options could help to explain the rise in repurchases at the expense of 
dividends. Managers who hold stock options have incentive to increase stock repurchases 
and decrease dividends because repurchases increase the value of the underlying stock 
(which in turn moves their options more in-the-money) , while dividends decrease the value 
(leading to options being more out-of-the-money). 
It is important to note that these findings apply to situations where managers have 
been offered stock options, but h~ve not actually exercised those options. Lambert, Lanen, 
I I 
and Larcker (1989) point out that stock options may not affect dividend policy 
( 
immediately, because options are exercisable over a period of time, usually up to 10 years. 
Once a manager exercises the option and takes ownership of the stock, there may be a 
different effect on dividend policy. White ( 1996) indicates that dividend yield is linked to 
managements' stock ownership, and that top managers who are also shareholders are less 
averse to dividends than managers who do not have direct access to the cash distributed as 
dividends. Therefore, a reasonable assumption is that, while management stock options 
lead to a decrease in dividend payments, management stock ownership may lead to an 
increase in dividends. 
Many authors have investigated the determinants that influence the likelihood that 
a firm will pay dividends, including Denis & Osobov (2008), Fama & French (2001, 2015), 
3 
and Chen & Steiner (1999). Some of the reasons they have found include firm size, growth 
opportunity, profitability, risk, ratio ofretained earnings to total equity, and free cash flow. 
When considering investment opportunities, Rozeff (1982) has shown that greater growth 
leads to lower dividends ~ measured by the dividend yield. Additionally, Kale and Noe 
(1990) show that higher risk results in lower total dividend payments. Both of these 
findings are related to the fact that firms are investing free cash flow rather than distributing 
it as dividends. This idea is solidified by Myers and Majluf (1984), who reason that firms 
may have to choose between dividend payments and capital expenditures. Jensen, Solberg 
and Zorn (1982) explore the relationship between the dividend payout ratio and 
profitability, and conclude that higher profitability is expected to result in higher dividend 
payout ratios. 
Previous studies show ¢vidence suggesting that greater insider ownership is 
I I 
connected with lower dividend payments. Rozeff (1982) finds a negative relationship 
( 
between insider ownership and dividend yield among firms. This is confirmed by Jensen 
Solberg and Zorn (1982), who state that insider ownership has a negative influence on a 
firm's dividend payout ratio. However, Farinah (2002) finds that the relationship between 
the dividend payout ratio and managerial ownership takes on a U shape, and at an 
entrenchment level of 30% the coefficient estimate changes from negative to positive. 
Fama and French (2001) show that the number .of firms who pay dividends peaked 
in 1978, but has steadily fallen fyomthat time until 1999, when their study was complete. 
However, more recently, Julio & Ikenberry (2004) find that dividend payments are on the 
rebound. They suggest several reasons that may contribute to this change, none of which 
directly address diversification. Although previous research has investigated the 
4 
relationship between managerial ownership and total dollar value of dividends, dividend 
yield, and dividend payout ratios, it has not addressed dividends per share. This is not a 
trivial difference. While dividends per share is used to calculate dividend yield, if a 
manager wishes to get a (?ash payment from her stock then she cares about the dividends 
per share, not the other measures. Fluctuations in stock price impacts the yield and 
therefore can distort implications from examining the relationship between dividend yield 
and compensation. Thus, this study focuses on dividend per share rather than yield. 
Based on this reasoning, it becomes evident that insiders need a way to diversify 
) 
their holdings. If managers have some kind of influence over the dividend policy of the 
firm, then they have a way to extract cash from their shares without selling stock. This line 
of thought leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: Managers who have greater power over the dividend policy and who 
have a greater portion of tHeir own portfolio in company stock, will have a larger 
dividend payout policy, as measured by dividends per share, than those who do not. 
The work proposed -in this paper seeks to test this hypothesis. 
II. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
The first step in testing this hypothesis is to determine a means to measure the level 
of power a particular manager has over dividend policy. One available method, and the 
method that is employed for this study, involves looking at managerial entrenchment as it 
is measured by the G Index, which is established by Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick (2003). 
The G index indicates the number of anti-takeover provisions that a firm has, and measures 
inability to remove a manager. The higher a firm's G Index, the more entrenched a 
manager is. 
5 
The next step is to decide which other variables need to be added to the regression 
equation. Accordihg to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the proportion of equity controlled 
by insiders should influence the policies of a firm. One example of this is the dividend 
policy. Jensen Solberg and Zorn (1992) validate this, stating that inside ownership is an 
important component in determining dividend policy. As a result, the percentage of the 
company owned by a particular manager is included. It is represented by the variable pown 
and quantified as the number of shares owned by the executive divided by the number of 
shares outstanding. A second analysis is conducted using a similar ownership measure, 
the value of a managers shares as a percentage of his total compensation. This variable is 
denoted as potc and computed as total number of shares owned by the CEO or CFO 
multiplied by the price per share, all divided by the total annual compensation of the 
executive. 
I I 
According to Fama and French (2001), three important characteristics that 
determine dividend policy are profitability, investment opportunities, and size. In light of 
this information, these three additional control variables are used in the regressions, all 
measured as established by Fama and French (2001, 2015), The first, profitability, is 
represented by prof and measured as aggregate earnings/aggregate assets. The next one, 
capital expenditures, is used as a means of measuring investment opportunitie_s, and is 
represented by capex. Capex is computed as growth of total assets for fiscal year ending 
in t-1 divided by total assets at the end of t-2. The third variable, size, is quantified as price 
per share multiplied by number of shares outstanding. 
An additional consideration is whether or not a particular firm paid dividend's last 
year, as this would have an impact on whether or not dividends are paid in subsequent 
6 
years. This is signified by the variable dpslag and added to the regression equations. For 
.~. .,. 
the Probit regressions, dpslag is a binary variable that equals 1 if the firm paid dividends 
last year and O otherwise. Dpslag is altered for the Tobit regressions, and is set equal to 
the monetary value of last year's dividend payment. 
Due to a limitation in the data, only executives who are listed as the firm's Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) or Chief Financial Officer (CFO) are included. In order to 
examine relevant difference between CEOs and CFOs, we introduce a binary variable 
named CEO. CEO takes on the value of 1 if the executive is the CEO and O for the CFO. 
This binary variable is interacted with both lnpown and lnpotc. Lastly, the dependent 
variable is dividends per share. This is denoted as dps and measured as total dividends 
divided by total number of shares' outstanding. Descriptive statistics of the data can be seen 
in Table 1. 
,' I 
Due to the high correlation between pown and potc, separate regressions are 
estimated using each ownership variable independently. The variables that are created 
when the ownership variables are interacted with the power measure are also highly 
correlated. To account for this multicollinearity, the interaction terms lnpown_g and 
lnpotc _g are residual centered, as pioneered by Lance (1988), before being included in the 
regressions. These correlations can be seen in Table 2. 
Whether or not a firm pays dividends is not randomly determined, but is a decision 
that is made, which leads to selection bias. As can be seen in Figure 1, the dependent 
variable (lndps) is censored, causing a concentration of observations with the value of zero. 
In order to account for this, the Heckman two-stage estimation . procedure is used 
(Heckman, 1979). 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Panel A: Raw Variables 
Variable Mean Stand Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
dps 0.2574 0.4132 0.0000 0.0175 0.3636 
gindex 8.9680 2.6190 7.0000 9.0000 11.0000 
pown 0.0204 0.0564 0.0002 0.0012 0.0068 
potc 20.7571 91.5498 0.2495 0.9493 3.5552 
prof 0.0857 0.1035 0.0445 0.0890 0.1384 
capex 6.0278 22.6089 -0.7326 0.0039 2.6840 
size 5.33E+09 l.38E+10 4.56E+08 l.23E+09 3.54E+09 
CEO 0.9058 0.2922 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
re to_tot 0.3173 2.4555 0.2029 0.5706 0.8578 
Panel B: Logged Variables 
Variable Mean Stand Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
lndps 0.1885 0.2666 0.0000 0.0173 0.3102 
lngindex 2.2623 0.2791 2.0794 2.3026 2.4849 
lnpown 0.0189 0.0503 0.0002 0.0012 0.0067 
lnpotc 1.1840 1.4169 · 0.2228 0.6675 1.5163 
lnprof 0.0771 0.1039 0.0436 0.0853 0.1297 
lncapex -0.0020 2.0029 -1.3192 0.0039 1.3040 
lnsize 20.9554 1.8415 19.9377 20.9302 21.9883 
lnre to tot 0.4043 0.5362 0.2441 0.4771 0.6314 
Number of Observations: I I 5359.0000 
Number of Unique firms: 1260 .0000 
Average Number of years per firm : 6.2400 
The first step in this procedure is to use a Probit model , the results of which are 
used to generate the inverse Mills ratio. The equation used in the Probit is modeled after 
the Probit regression equation used by Fama and French (2001 ). An additional variable 
needs to be created for use in the Probit , since a Probit model needs one more variable than 
the accompanying Tobit model. This variable is re _to _tot, and is calculated as the ratio of 
retained earnings to total equity . This is established by Denis & Osobov (2008) as a 
determinant of whether or not a firm pays dividends. The results from the Probit model are 
then used to calculate the inverse Mills ratio, represented by !MR. The IMR is used as an 
additional explanatory variable in the Tobit model. 
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TABLE 2: CORRELATION BETWEEN VARIABLES 
lndps lngindex lnpown lnpotc lnprof lncapex lnsize lnre_to_tot . lnpown_ceo lnpotc_ceo lnpown_g lnpotc_g 
lndps 1.0000 
lngindex 0.2431 1.0000 
lnpown 0.0521 -0.1837 1.0000 
lnpotc 0.0391 -0.1581 0.7913 1.0000 
lnprof 0.1424 0.0197 -0.0057 0.1010 1.0000 
" 
.. 
lncapex 0.0037 -0.0342 0.0106 0.0034 0.0065 1.0000 
lnsize 0.2832 0.1219 -0.1459 0.0117 0.3541 -0.0202 1.0000 . -
lnre_to_tot 0.2215 0.0527 0.0282 0.0404 0.2117 0.0096 0.0709 1.0000 
lnpown_ceo 0.0519 -0.1839 1.0000 0.7911 0.0058 0.0106 ·cf1455 - 0.0282 1.0000 
lnpotc_ceo 0.0389 -0.1615 0.7919 0.9888 0.0913 0.0016 0.0018 0.0371 0.7924 1.0000 
lnpown_g 0.0549 -0.1022 0.9662 0.8198 0.0002 0.0099 0.1675 0.0172 0.9662 0.8213 1.0000 
lnpotc g 0.0219 -0.0001 0.6938 0.9567 0.1258 0.0025 0.0597 0.0444 0.6935 0.9407 0.7435 1.0000 
•. It) • 
... 
It) • . 
0 .5 1.5 
lndps 
Figure 1: Distribution of the log of Dividends per Share 
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Data is analyzed in 3 different sets of regression equations. The first is using Compustat 
data before it is merged with the ISS data containing the power measure. The second is estimated 
using all available data sets; but without including the G index in the regression equations. Lastly, 
regressions are estimated using all available data and including the power measure. For the final 
part of the analysis, gindex is interacted with both pown and potc and included in the regressions. 
This leads to the following regression equations: 
Regression Equations: 
Part 1 & 2 
dpsdummy = Po + P2 lnpown + P3 lnprof + P4 lncapex + Ps lnsize + P6dpslag + P7 CEO 
+ P8 lnpown *CEO+ P9 lnretoto 
dpsdummy = Po + P2 lnpotc + P3 lnprof + P4 lncapex + /35 lnsize + P6 dpslag + P7 CEO 
+ Palnpotc *CEO+ P9lnretoto 
lndps = Po + P2 lnpown + P3 lnpfof + P4 lncapex + Ps lnsize + P6dpslag + P7 CEO 
+ P8 lnpown *CEO+ p91MR 
lndps = Po + P2 lnpotc + P3 lnprof + P4 lncapex + Ps lnsize + P6 dpslag + P7 CEO 
+ P8 lnpotc *CEO+ p91MR 
Part 3: 
dpsdummy = Po + P2 lnpown + P3 lngindex + P4 lnprof + Pslncapex + P6 lnsize 
+ P7 dpslag + P8 CEO + P9 ln(pown * g) + P10 lnpown *CEO+ P11 lnretoto 
dpsdummy = Po + P2 lnpotc + P3 lngindex + P4 lnprof + Pslncapex + P6 lnsize 
+ P7dpslag + P8 CEO + P9 ln(potc * g) + P10 lnpotc *CEO+ P11 lnretoto 
lndps = Po + P2lnpow + P3 lngindex + P4 lnprof + Pslncapex + P6 lnsize + P7dpslag 
+ p8 CEO + P91n(pown * g) + P10 lnpown *CEO+ p11 1MR 
lndps = Po + P2 lnpotc + P3 lngindex + P4 lnprof + Pslncapex + P6 lnsize +P 7dpslag 
+ P8 CEO + P91n(potc * g) + P10 lnpotc *CEO+ P11 I,MR 
where dps = dividends per share 
pown = percentage of the company that is owned by the CEO 
potc= value of the managers shares as a percentage of his total compensation 
prof= profitability of the firm · 
capex = capital expenditures of the firm 
size = size of the firm 
dpslag=lagged dividend decision 
CEO=dummy denoting whether manager is CEO or CFO 
re_ to_ tot= ratio of retained earnings to total equity 
gindex= the power measure G Index 
10 
Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn ( 1992) show that managerial ownership, debt, and dividends are 
jointly related. This indicates that insider ownership is related to firm specific attributes that affect 
dividend policy, resulting in endogeneity between dividends and managerial ownership. In order 
to examine how these variables relate to one another, Chen & Steiner (1999) use a model where 
managerial ownership and dividend policy are treated as internally originating, jointly determined 
variables. Based on this precedence, the assumption is made that there is endogeneity in the model. 
Because of this, the results of the regressions would only allow for discussion of correlation 
between variables. In order to expapd this analysis to address causality, a panel vector 
autoregression (pvar) coupled with a Granger causality test are used. Default options are used 
/ I 
when estimating the pvar. 
Some of the variables that are included in the regression equations are not needed for the 
pvar and the causality test, and are dropped. The variables that are included in this portion of the 
analysis are lndps, lngindex, lnprof lncapex, lnsize, CEO, lnpown, and lnpotc. As is done with the 
regressions, separate pvar's are ran for the two ownership variables in order to account for 
multicollinearity. 
Before the pvar and causality test can be used, a unit root test is conducted for each variable 
in order to ensure that the data is stationary. The assumption is made that rejection of the null 
hypothesis, which is that all panels contain a unit root, on 3 of the 4 tests is sufficient to establish 
data stationarity. Results from the unit root test show that all variables except lngindex are 
stationary and do not contain a unit root. It is not surprising that lngindex is non-stationary, as the 
11 
original data only includes information for even years, and missing values are generated through 
imputation for the odd year-s (1997, 1999, 2001, 2003 , & 2005). In addition to this , the G Index is 
highly invariant, meaning that this year's G index value would be highly dependent on last year's. 
Because of these reasons , analysis will continue despite non-stationarity in the G Index. Results 
from the unit root tests are displayed in Table 3. 
TABLE 3: RESULTS FROM UNIT ROOT TESTS 
Variable Inverse Chi-squared Inverse Normal Inverse Logit Mod Inv Chi Squared 
/ncapex 2539.6410 -12.2736 -25.6062 33.7228 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
lnprof 1985.5021 -7.8584 -16.7663 21.4419 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
lndps 1468.7567 0.0773 -9.5202 10.0439 
(0.0000) (0.7801) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
lnsize 2192.7531 -6.2217 -17.6821 26.0350 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
lnre_to_tot 1803 .1721 -2.8236 -12.0486 19.8404 
(0.0000) (0.0024) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
lngindex 985.4181 -2.8662 -10.7888 -0.7221 
(0.7626) (0.0021) (0.0000) (0.7649) 
lnpown 2433 .8952 -1.6886 -16.1741 31.4545 
(0.0000) (0.0456) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
lnpotc 1586 .8905 -1.7937 -10.3597 14.3068 
(0.0000) (0.0364) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
lnpown_ceo 2114 .0188 -0.9065 -13.8929 24.3584 
(0.0000) (0.1823) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
lnpotc_ceo 1467 .8625 -1.8295 -9.9785 11.5903 
(0.0000) (0.0337) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Number of Panels : 403 
T Statistics on first line, P-values in parentheses 
III. DATA 
Data is obtained from Compustat and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) within 
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The sample size includes all firms that data is provided 
for. However, financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utility firms (SIC 4900-4999) are excluded for 
12 
this analysis. It is important to realize that Compustat and ISS are limited to companies contained 
in the WRDS database; th~y do not include information for any other firms. 
Data analysis takes,,iace over two different time spans. When evaluating the data prior to 
adding the power measure, the range of years is 1992-2006. However, the available data from ISS 
only includes the years 1996-2006. As a result, once the data with the power measure G Index is 
added, the time span is reduced to 1996-2006. 
Before beginning examination of the data, a rudimentary inspection is conducted. For all 
observations within the data set where information is missing, the missing values are replaced with 
a 0. Observations that are duplicates for all variables are dropped. Due to a limitation in the data, 
any observations that have executives who are not represented as the CEO or the CFO are dropped. 
In order to try and limit the extreme values in the data, the variables are winsorized. Lastly, with 
the exception of binary variables, all v~ables are logged before beginning regression analysis. 
This is done in order to normalize the d{stfibutions, as well as to create an elasticity. This leads to 
5359 observations, with 1260 unique firms and an average number of years per firm of 6.24. 
IV. RESULTS 
Table 4 presents the results from the marginal effects of the Probit regressions. The first 
two columns display results when using only Compustat Data. Results indicate that if the 
executive is a CEO, a 1 % increase inpown leads to 0.054% increase in dividends per share. If the 
executive is the CFO, this increases to 0.485%. When the ownership variable potc is used and the 
executive is the CEO, results indicate a 1% increase inpotc is associated with 0.0001% decrease 
in dps. For a CFO, this changes to an increase of 0.033%, and is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. 
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TABLE 4: PROBIT REGRESSION MARGINAL EFFECTS RESULTS 
Results Usit1g Comp/Exec 
Data Results Excluding G Index Results Including G Index 
Ownership Variable: POWN POTC POWN POTC POWN POTC 
lnpown 0.485 1.309 0.966 
(1.03) (0.24) (0.18) 
lnpown_ceo -0.431 -1.244 -0.873 
(-0.91) (-0.23) (-0.16) 
lnpown_g_rc -0.0128 
(-0.19) 
lnpotc 0.0331** 0.0132 0.0101 
(2.01) (0.87) (0.63) 
lnpotc_ceo -0.0332** -0.00960 -0.00546 
(-2.01) {-0.63) (-0.33) 
lnpotc_g_rc 0.00695 
(0.91) 
lnprof 0.0331 0.0499 0.148** * 0.156*** 0.153*** 0.154 *** 
{1.04) (1.57) (2.87) (2.82) (2.98) (2.83) 
lncopex -0.000676 -0.000351 0.000182 -0.000746 0.000334 -0.000617 
(-0.58) (-0.30) (0.13) (-0.52) (0.23) (-0.42) 
lnsize 0.00918*** 0.00379 0.00471 0.00127 0.00436 0.000872 
(4.72) (i. 36) (1.59) (0.30) (1.56) (0.20) 
dpslog_1 0.873*** 0.86~*** 0.897*** 0.897*** 0.893*** 0.894*** 
(119.34) (li°10[63) (102.67) (94.40) (100.47) {91.37) 
CEO 0.00839 0.0260 ** 0.00982 0.0184 0.0114 0.0164 
(0.85) (2.00) (0.78) (1.12) (0.92) (0.97) 
lnre_to_tot 0.0272*** 0.0290*** 0.0272*** 0.0279*** 0.0268 *** 0.0279*** 
(4.51) (4.76) (3.55) (3.69) (3.50) (3.70) 
lngindex 0.0325*** 0.0276 ** 
(2.72) (2.21) 
Time Fixed Effects: yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 8,413 8,070 3,835 3,682 3,835 3,682 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The third and fourth column include ISS data, but the regression equations do not include 
the power measure. Results suggest that, when usingpown as the ownership variable , a 1 % 
increase in pown leads to a 0.065% increase in dividends per share. They further indicate that a 
1% increase inpotc leads to a 0.004% increase in dps. Both of these are conditional on the 
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executive being a CEO. If the executive is a CFO, then a 1% increase inpown andpotc lead to a 
1.309% and 0.013% incr~ase in dividends per share. 
· . ..... 
The last two columns in Table 4 include data from both Compustat and ISS, and the 
regression equations include the power measure. Based on results from the regressions, a I% 
ii?-crease in pown leads to a 0.093% increase in dividends per share, and a 1 % increase in potc 
leads to a 0.005% increase in dps for an executive who is the CEO. Similarly, if the manager is a 
CFO, a 1 % increase in pown leads to a 0.966% increase in dps, and a 1 % increase in potc leads to 
a 0.010% increase in dividends per share. Results further indicate that a 1% increase in gindex 
leads to a 0.032% increase in dividends per share for someone who owns an average percentage 
of the firm, and is statistically significant at the 5% level. They also suggest that, for someone 
! 
with an average potc, a 1 % increase in gindex results in a 0.036% increase in dividends per share. 
Table 5 reports results from the ,Tqbit regressions, using the same column format as Table 
4. Findings in columns 1 & 2 indicate that for an executive who is a CEO, a 1 % increase in pown 
leads to a 0.099% increase in dividends per share and a 1 % increase in potc leads to a 0.00004% 
increase in dps. The former of these is statistically significant at the 5% level. Similarly, if the 
manager is a CFO a 1 % increase in pown suggests a 0.184% increase in dps and a 1 % increase in 
potc leads to a 0.005% increase in dps. 
Column 3 results indicate that a 1 % increase in pown signifies a 0.172% increase in dps if 
the executive is the CEO, and a 1. 785% increase otherwise. The first of these is statistically 
significant at the I% level. Column 4 suggests that a 1 % increase in potc leads to a 0.006% 
increase and a 0.004% decrease in dividends per share for a CEO and a CFO, respectively. The 
first of these is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE 5: RESULTS FROM TOBIT REGRESSION 
Results Using Comp/Exec Data Results Excluding G Index Results Including G Index 
VARIABLES Tobit 1 Powr.i• Tobit 1 Pote Tobit 2 Pawn Tobit 2 Pote Tobit 3 Pawn Tobit 3 Pote 
lnpown 0.184 1.785 1.156 
(0.27) (0.17) {0.11) 
lnpown_ceo -0.0853 -1.613 -0.967 
(-0.13) (-0.16) (-0.09) 
lnpown_g_rc 0.0150 
{0.28) 
f'!potc 0.00448 -0.00381 -0.00452 
(0.26) {-0.22) (-0.26) 
lnpotc_ceo -0.00444 0.00975 0.0112 
{-0.26) (0.56) {0.63) 
lnpotc_g_rc 0.00313 
(0.44) 
lnprof 0.0435 0.0449 0.169*** 0.176*** 0.174*** 0.184*** 
(1.62) (1.64) (3.96) (4.02) (4.07) (4.17) 
lncapex -0.000683 -0.00121 0.00123 0.000911 0.00124 0.000946 
(-0.62) (-1.07) (0.81) {0.?9) (0.82) (0.61) 
lnsize 0.0108*** 0.0113*** 0.00718*** 0.00651 *** 0.00717*** · 0.00612*** 
(i41) (7.79) (3.49} {3.15) (3.45} (2.94} 
dpslag_2 0.853*** 0.850*** 0.883*** 0.881*** 0.878*** 0.876*** 
(93.02) (90.00) ; (66.48} (65.29} (65.43) (64.44) 
CEO 0.00361 0.0141 i 0.00375 0.000387 0.00440 0.000464 
(0.37) (0.97) (0.31} (0.02) (0.36) (0.03) 
lngindex 0.0221* 0.0236* * 
(1.91) (2.01} 
IMR_1 -0.669** * -0.563*** -0.585*** 
(-38.41) (-25.27) (-25.15} 
IMR_2 -0.639*** -0.550*** -0.565 *** 
(-37.76) (-25.07) (-24.92) 
Constant -0.0287 -0.0321 0.0148 0.0374 -0.0440 -0.0161 
(-0.91) (-0.98) (0.33) (0.84) (-0.86) (-0.32) 
Observations 8,369 8,017 3,828 3,670 3,828 3,670 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Results from column 5 & 6 demonstrate that, if the executive is the CEO, dividends per 
share will increase by 0.189% and 0.007% given a 1% increase in pawn and pate. Both of these 
are statistically significant , the first at the I% level and the second at the 5% level. Similarly, if 
the executive is the CFO a I% increase in pawn and pate imply a dps increase of 1.156% and a 
decrease in dps of 0.005%. Results further indicate that a I% increase in gindex leads to a 0.022% 
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increase in dividends per share for someone who owns an average percentage of the firm. They 
also suggest that, for som~ne with an average pate, a 1 % increase in gindex results in a 0.027% 
increase in dps. 
Results from the panel vector autoregression are illustrated in Table 6. They demonstrate 
TABLE 6: PANEL VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION RESULTS 
Panel A: Results Using POWN 
VARIABLES lndps lngindex lnpown lnprof lncapex lnsize 
L.lndps 0.241* 0.0401 0.0217 -0.0285 0.964 -0.853** 
(1.82) (0.67) (0.56) (-0.66) (0.58) (-2.16) 
L.lngindex 0.372*** 0.814*** -0.0204 0.0563 -0.0577 0.978*** 
(4.71) {14.40) (-1.17) {1.48) (-0.05) {2.95) 
L.lnpown -1.062* -0.283 1.173*** 0.160 2.609 -0.428 
(-1.80) (-1.14) (4.36) (0.66) (0.39) (-0.24) 
L.lnprof -0.222*** 0.00933 0.0220 0.582*** -0.842 -0.304 
(-2.78) (0.19) (1.22) {6.38) (-0.63) (-0.51) 
L.lncapex -0.000855 0.00239* 0.000125 0.000495 0.542*** -0.00470 
(-0.45) (L87) (0.41) (0.43) (11.24) (-0.50) 
L.lnsize 0.0895*** -0.015~** -0.00295 0.0113 0.140 0.950*** 
(5.46) (-2.05) (-0.83) (1.59) (0.56) (14.06) 
Observations 2,892 2,892 2,892 2,892 2,892 2,892 
Panel B: Results Using POTC 
VARIABLES lndps lngindex lnpotc lnprof lncapex lnsize 
L.lndps 0.0208 0.0470 -0.905 -0.0262 -0.368 -1.664** 
(0.11) (0.53) (-0.89) (-0.44) (-0.16) (-2.52) 
L.lngindex 0.465*** 0.801*** 0.959 0.0489 0.205 1.407*** 
(3.95) (11.66) (1.59) (1.07) (0.13) (3.06) 
L.lnpotc -0.0568*** -0.00522 0.485*** 0.00299 -0.217 -0.0991 
(-3.47) {-0.68) (4.94) {0.42) (-0.96) (-1.56) 
L.lnprof -0.304*** 0.00133 --0.0376 0.544*** -1.459 -0.776 
(-2.74) (0.02) (-0.07) (5.79) (-0.95) (-1.14) 
L.lncapex -0.00302 0.00214 -0.00690 -3.23e-05 0.531 *** -0.0116 
(-1.29) {1.53) (-0.53) (-0.03) (10.36) (-1.05) 
L.lnsize 0.151 *** -0.0114 0.345** 0.00372 0.420 1.059*** 
(5.30) (-0.97) (2.28) (0.40) {1.14) (10.66) 
Observations 2,544 2,544 2,544 2,544 2,544 2,544 
z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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that when using the ownership variable pawn a 1 % increase in the lag of gindex is associated with 
a 0 .3 72% increase in dps, and is statistically significant at the 1 % level. They also show that a 1 % 
increase in the lag of pawn 1eads to a 1.062% decrease in dps, and is statistically significant at 
the10% level. Findings further suggest that when using the pate as the ownership variable, 1 % 
increases in the lags of gindex and pate are associated with a 0.465% increase and a 0.057% 
decrease in dps. Both of these findings are statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
Results from the Granger Causality Tests are displayed in Table 7. Panel A shows results 
when the ownership variable pown is used, and pate is shown in Panel B. When using the 
ownership variable pawn, lngindex, lnpawn, lnprof and lnsize granger cause lndps. All of these 
are statistically significant at the 1 % level, except lnpawn, which is statistically significant at the 
10% level. According to results from Papel B, lngindex, lnpate, lnpraf and lnsize granger cause 
lndps. All of these variables are statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
/ I 
V. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to determine if managers who have greater power over the 
dividend policy and who have a larger portion of their own portfolio in company stock will have 
a larger dividend payout policy, as measured by dividends per share, than those who do not. The 
source of the data is WRDS, and information is used for all firms included in their database, with 
the exception of financial and utility firms. 
It is known prior to data examination that insider ownership is related to firm specific 
characteristics that affect dividend policy, therefore introducing endogeneity into the model. 
Because of this, regression analysis can only address correlation, and a panel vector autoregression 
coupled with a granger causality test are added to the analysis in order to discuss causality. 
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TABLE 7: GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST RESULTS 
-~ ~ . Panel A: Results Using POWN 
Equations: 
Variables : 'lrtdps lngindex lnpown lnprof lncapex lnsize 
lndps 0.446 0.316 0.434 0.342 4.664** 
{0.504) {0.574) (0.510) (0.559) (0.031} 
lngindex 22.196*** 1.367 2.187 0.002 8.724*** 
(0.000) (0.242) (0.139} (0.961) (0.003} 
lnpown 3.230* 1.293 0.432 0.154 0.057 
(0.072) (0.256) (0.511) (0.695) (0.811) 
lnprof 7.751 *** 0.034 1.498 0.399 0.261 
(0.005) (0.853) (0.221) (0.528) (0.609} 
lncapex 0.203 3.484* 0.166 0.187 0.249 
(0.653) (0.062) (0.684) (0.666) (0.618) 
lnsize 29.788*** 4.223** 0.697 2.527 0.314 
(0.000) (0.040) (0.404) (0.112) (0.575) 
Panel B: Results Using POTC 
Equations: 
Variables : lndps lngindex lnpotc lnprof lncapex lnsize 
lndps 0.286 0.792 0.189 0.024 6.367** 
(0:593) (0.373) (0.663) (0.876) (0.012) 
lngindex 15.574*** 2.542 1.152 0.018 9.334*** 
(0.000) - (0.111) (0.283) (0.893) (0.002) 
lnpotc 12.045*** 6.463 0.174 0.931 2.419 
(0.001) (0.496) (0.677) (0.335) (0.120) 
lnprof 7.5*** 0.001 0.005 0.896 1.29 
(0.006) (0.982) {0.944) (0.344) (0.256) 
lncapex 1.661 2.355 0.285 0.001 1.095 
(0.198) (0.125) (0.594) (0.979) (0.295) 
lnsize 28.091*** 0.934 5.183** 0.156 1.301 
(0.000) (0.334) (0.023) (0.693) (0.254) 
Chi squared values on fi rst line. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
P-Values in Parentheses 
Results from the Probit regressions suggest that, holding all else constant , a 1 % increase in 
po tc is correlated with a 0.033% increase in dividends per share when using only Compustat Data, 
and when the executive is a CFO. They further imply that a 1 % increase in gindex is correlated 
with a 0.032% increase in dividends per share when the executive has an average pown. 
When looking at results from the Tobit regressions, results imply correlation between a 1 % 
increase in pown and a 0.099% increase in dps when using only Compustat data and when the 
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manager is a CEO. They further show association between a 1 % increase in pown and a 0.172% 
increase in dps when gindex-is not used in the regression equations and the manager is the CEO. 
They also indicate statisticar significance between both pown and potc and dividends per share 
when the power measure is included. Specifically, a 1 % increase in pown is associated with a 
0.189% increase in dps. Lastly, a 1% increase inpotc is correlated with a 0.006% increase in dps 
when executive is CEO and gindex is not included in regression, and a 0.007% increase in dps 
when gindex is included. 
After estimating the panel vector autoregression and conducting a Granger causality test, 
results signal that there is a relationship between gindex and dps when using both ownership 
variables. Specifically, when using pown a 1 % increase in the lag of gindex is correlated with a 
0.372% increase in dps, and a 0.465% increase in dps when using potc. Additionally, a 1% 
increase in the lag of pown is correlated :with a 1.062% decrease in dps and a 1 % increase in the 
/ I 
lag of potc is associated with a 0.057 decrease in dps. 
Results further indicate that lngindex granger causes lndps. These results occur 
individually for each of the ownership variables, pown and potc. Findings further indicate that, 
when using pown as the ownership variable, lnpown granger causes lndps. When using potc , 
results illustrate that lnpotc granger causes lndps. 
The original hypothesis expected to find a positive relationship between the ownership 
variables pown and potc and dividends per share, however, results from the pvar and Granger 
causality test show a negative relationship. Potential reasons for this opposing relationship will be 
explored in future work. Pvar and Granger causality test results further indicate a positive 
relationship between lngindex and the dps. These results could be consistent with the portion of 
the hypothesis that states that managers who have greater power over dividend policy, as measured 
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by the G Index, will have a larger dividend payout, as measured by dividends per share. However, 
the relationship between the ownership variables and dividends per share must be explored further 
before any conclusions earl be made on this matter. 
VI. FURTHER RESERACH 
When considering further research, there are several venues which could be explored. One, 
which is closely related to the research question being addressed in this paper, is considering 
whether a firm who is issuing more dividends in lieu of sale of stock is selling more stock than 
firms who are not. 
Another potential research topic lies around a hypothesis that managers will sell stock less 
often and in smaller amounts when therhave small holdings in company stock, and consequently 
do not have a diversification problem as a;result of management stock ownership. Unfortunately, 
,· I 
the authors do not currently have access to the data that would allow pursuit of this question. 
A third possibility for further research is whether managers are more likely to exercise 
stock options and retain the shares of stock just prior to the ex-dividend date, making them eligible 
for the most recently declared dividend. Again, there is a limitation to the data making it 
impossible for this research idea to be explored at this time. 
Lastly, one line of research that may be continued is examining what is happening to 
dividend payments now. As stated in the literature review above, Fama and French (2001) studied 
firms who paid dividends up until the year 1999. Julio & Ikenberry (2004) have supplemented 
their study, going up to the year 2004. At the time of this paper, it has been 13 years since Julio 
& Ikenberry completed their work. A viable research pursuit would be to explore what has 
happened to dividends since the conclusion of their work. 
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